March 1, 2008
According to our rulers, specifically the CFR branch, terrorists love the idea of targeting nuclear plants. “Most nuclear facilities are well fortified and difficult for terrorists to attack. But they remain attractive targets because of the potential to inflict devastating damage,” the eggheads over at the Council proclaim.
The 9/11 Commission Report noted that both Mohammed Atta, one of the 9/11 pilots, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the attacks, “considered targeting a nuclear facility.” In October 2001, U.S. officials shut down operations at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania for four hours and suspended flights at nearby airports, citing a “credible threat” of terrorism. The alert turned out to be a false alarm.
|According to our rulers, specifically the CFR branch, terrorists love the idea of targeting nuclear plants, never mind they have yet to do so in the nearly seven years since September 11, 2001.|
You know, the Mohamed Atta who attended the International Officers School at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama, and the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who received a U.S. visa despite a 1996 indictment linking him to terrorist plots.
Not to worry, the Council advises, because even “prior to the 9/11 attacks, nuclear plants had extensive security measures in place. Each plant has a trained security force and a series of physical barriers,” and “[d]ouble fences, barbed wire, and surveillance systems are common,” not that such precautions will prevent terrorism, at least according to a Chief Powerplant Operator at an unspecified Columbia River dam in the northwest, writing on a Yahoo message group.
“Plant physical security is better than before 9-11, but it is still horrible,” the operator insists. It is relatively easy to “follow someone in through a security gate” and “we have so many contractors working on site, that anyone could walk in or out, and no one would notice.” In other words, had a Mohamed Atta or some other miscreant wanted to “cause as many as 44,000 near-term casualties, and 500,000 long-term deaths from cancer,” as the CFR notes, it would have been an easy task.
A couple weeks after the September 11 attacks, the Washington based Nuclear Control Institute and the Los Angeles based Committee to Bridge the Gap “laid out specific proposals for denying terrorists the opportunity to destroy nuclear power plants, including use of National Guard troops to deter attacks from land and water, deployment of advanced anti-aircraft weapons to defeat suicidal attacks from the air, and a thorough re-vetting of all plant employees and contractors to protect against sabotage by insiders,” Cat Lazaroff wrote for the Environment News Service.
But none of this has come to pass. And there is a good reason. Because nuclear power plants, as well as the rest of the infrastructure in the United States, is not in danger of falling victim to a terrorist attack.
Or rather, it is not in danger of falling victim to a terrorist attack unless the government and the neocons in the Pentagon and the CIA have good reason to do so.
On that day, no amount of National Guard troops — most who are in Iraq anyway — or missile batteries will protect our nuclear plants.